

Security Sector Reform — Theory and Practice

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Abstract. *Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept and activity of the democratic transformation of defence, justice and rule of law systems. In accordance with the United Nations approach, SSR is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict. Over the last few decades, with many countries evolving and developing democratic processes, the concept has gained interest and popularity in international organisations and states heading towards a positive change. In the past, full SSR activities had been successfully conducted in central and east European post-communist countries. Nowadays, the process is carried out among African and Middle East countries, in some of them this being extremely challenging. A considerable degree of complexity characterizes the SSR processes. For this reason, a great deal of effort has been exerted with the aim of normalising rules and conditions for conducting SSR. The purpose of these activities is to ensure the widest possible effect of the use of scarce expert resources. SSR is a relatively new area of expertise suffering from a scarcity of literature presenting theory in conjunction with practice. During the research conducted it was assumed that, in spite of a wide array of actions to be executed within SSR in different states, they should be interconnected by a general model which would ensure the greatest effect. The aim of this essay is to present selected theoretical aspects of SSR, essential for increasing the effectiveness of the reforms conducted, illustrated with a practical example of the SSR process in Egypt.*

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Introduction

A few definitions for the term *security* may be identified. It can be defined as a state, or as a process leading to a presumed state. In the sense of a dynamic action applied in the current essay, *security* is defined as “ensuring the possibility to survive, develop and freely realise one’s own interests in given conditions, through taking advantage of favourable circumstances (opportunities), accepting challenges, reducing risks and counteracting threats to one’s own interests”.¹

Due to recent incidents and ongoing threats, including international terrorism, piracy, migration, regional instabilities and crises bringing about territorial claims resulting in thousands of people killed and wounded, not only in Africa and the Middle East, but also in Eastern Europe, the term *security* has become commonly used in the theory and practice of political sciences and international relations.

Security is a basic desire of every single human being, community and nation. Without this quality, all other desires people strive for completely lose their importance. Everybody wants to be safe and secure, irrespective of age, social status, nationality or education.

The Security Sector is a totality of national institutions and organs contributing

¹ Koziej S, *Wstęp do teorii i historii bezpieczeństwa*. Warsaw, 2010, p. 2.

to ensuring, in a broad sense, the security of state and society. It is assumed that the security sector usually consists of four components²:

1. Basic organs ensuring security, including armed forces, law and order forces, customs and reserve services as well as local security units.
2. Structures responsible for management of security, legislative and executive authorities, ministries of defence, internal and foreign affairs, advisory institutions in the field of national security, common and traditional authorities, organs of budgetary management, higher education institutions and media.
3. Justice institutions, including Ministry of Justice, Prosecutors Office, courts and executive and penitentiary services.
4. Unofficial security forces, private troops, security companies, liberation and guerrilla forces.

Security Sector Reform is a rather new term, adopted as a general concept of transforming security sectors in the states of the post-Soviet bloc after the collapse of the Berlin wall. SSR is a totality of actions directed at transforming all fields of a security sector in a way which would ensure an effective management and operation in line with the democratic norms and good governance principles. A democratically-based functional security sector should be under civilian control and parliamentary supervision.³

The research aim of this essay is to present selected theoretical SSR aspects, including conditions and phases of an effective SSR execution, and then illustrate this through a practical example of high complexity: the reform of Egypt's Security Sector. In this context, the main research problem was formulated in the form of the following question: "What should be the ideal conditions to ensure a *Model SSR Process* and how successfully was it implemented in the Egyptian case study? Solving the main research problem requires solving a few detailed problems defined among others, as ways of creating a favourable political environment, ways of determining boundary conditions and ensuring sustainability of efforts once the reformation process has concluded.

In the research hypothesis it was assumed that, despite a wide array of actions to be executed within SSR in different states, they should be interconnected by a general model which would ensure the greatest potential effectiveness.

To achieve the research aim, a range of activities was foreseen, comprising theoretical and empirical research. The research method was based on the resultant analysis of discussion, consultation and interviews conducted with representatives of international security organisations and states engaged in this field of interest. It was also based on interpretation of results deriving from analysis of the bibliography shown.

Conditions of Security Sector Reform

Security is a primary criterion for poverty reduction, economic growth and ensuring perspectives for societies' existence and also, in a wider context, for ensuring

² Concept for the European Community support in the field of Security Sector Reform. European Union. Brussels, 2006, p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*

the balanced development of whole states. According to the Human Development Report HDR of 2014, violent armed conflict is one of the fastest ways to drop down the chart of the Human Development Index (HDI), with a guarantee of staying at the bottom for a long period of time.⁴

Starting from the 1990s, states at a relatively early phase of development, with undefined political models and unregulated relations with their neighbours, were more than a half of all countries participating in armed conflicts — more than half of these located in Africa.

The United Nations Security Council UNSC specified that Security Sector Reform was “critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict”.⁵ Thus, the UNSC emphasised that SSR should be context-driven and that needs would differentiate from case to case. The UNSC encouraged countries to elaborate their SSR programmes in a holistic approach, one that would comprise strategic planning, institutional structures, management, operational capacities and civilian oversight. Moreover, the UNSC underlined the need for a balanced realisation of all SSR aspects and recognised the importance of inter-linkages between the SSR and other important areas of peace, stabilisation and reconstruction, including an effective justice system, firearms and ammunition control, gender equality, protection of vulnerable groups and in a wider sense of respecting human rights and dignity.⁶

Security Sector Reform is a comparatively new concept, however in the last decades significant progress has been achieved in its efficient implementation. Collective experiences have contributed to identifying and defining conditions determining final success. Among them there are⁷:

Creating a Single SSR Strategy

An important challenge is often the lack of a unified, comprehensive SSR strategy. Therefore, casual approaches are often applied. Areas of security sector-orientated reforms are often dealt with in isolation, when they should be seen as one complex issue. With no coordination of activities by different players, efforts are often duplicated. Key mistakes can be avoided; different solutions are recommended. One of them is to select a lead player (organisation, state or agency) which would comprehensively supervise all conducted activities. Each player engaged in SSR should have a full understanding of global policy, as well as SSR strategy, and closely cooperate and coordinate their own activities with the other players.

⁴ Human Development Report. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. United Nations Development Programme. New York, 2014, p. 5.

⁵ Presidential Statement 5632nd United Nations Security Council meeting 20 February 2007. New York, 2007. *Electronic source*: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8958.doc.htm>, accessed: 10.04.2016.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Handbook on Security Sector Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. OECD Publishing. Paris, 2007, p. 13.

Maximising Benefits of Means, Assets and Experiences

An essential condition of an efficient SSR is to maximise use of all available means, assets and experiences. For example, in the area of human resources, all organisations providing SSR services depend mainly on personnel with military, police, courts and prosecutor profiles. These personnel are highly educated, and possess significant expertise in their respective area, nevertheless they should also have a profound orientation in a given state's politics as well as a local specificity of the main issues.

Players performing SSR activities usually possess limited human expertise which could be quickly deployed in sometimes distant locations. Some of them may have never been engaged in SSR duties before. This is the reason why SSR orientation training and pre-deployment courses should be provided. It is also important to ensure linkage with civil society and the private sector, as aspects of reform implementation can be performed by non-governmental organisations and external consultancy companies.

The final results of SSR's are not only achieved through the enhancement of security forces' operational capacities, but also through improvement of their logistical possibilities and accountability. That is why expertise in institutional reform, human resources management and training is also desired.

Ensuring local ownership

A crucial condition is to ensure local ownership of a planned SSR effort. Senior management and command personnel should not only be aware, but also convinced, that they are the main executives and will also be the main beneficiaries of the reforms which are to be conducted, and not external personnel conducting the SSR process.

In fledgling democratic societies, where until recently power would have been executed by the military, there may be limited acceptance for political planning and conduct functions led by civilian experts. For this reason, these activities are often conducted by uniformed staff possessing limited experience and knowledge. Such occurrences may bring undesirable effects of security being treated as a means of authority rather than a basic obligation of any state towards their citizens.

Enhancing strategic approach and sustainability of efforts

The approach to SSR implementation has evolved from a casual, ad hoc, style to a deliberate comprehensive approach, comprising relations and interconnections between respective security sector elements. Modifications were also made in the practical approach underlining the influence of actions performed on the host state's security sector.

In order to avoid a loss of SSR achievements, it is essential to ensure sustainability of efforts after an integrated engagement is concluded. To make this possible, financial assets should be factored in to the reforms budget well in advance, and activated prior to SSR processes being terminated.

SSR phases

In principle, an effective SSR implementation comprises six main phases, among them the creation of a supportive political environment, conduct of security sector assessment, elaboration of strategy, strengthening national security capacities, reform implementation in respective subsectors and finally monitoring of the achieved effects and ensuring the sustainability of efforts.⁸

Ensuring political support

Security Sector Reform, together with its international support, is a deeply politicised process. It can be regarded from two aspects: full political will of the host state or full political support for or within the organisation which will conduct these reforms.

Modalities of ensuring security and justice by national institutions are important elements of state function and execution of power. For this reason, states are particularly sensitive about these. Anxieties may be provoked by suspicion that donor states will engage in intelligence collection on the organisation and running of the host state, or that they will primarily deal with realisation of their own strategic interests.

Finally, the host state may fear that the donor states will attempt to make them dependent on their production and distribution of deliverables. Nevertheless, these fears often remain in contradiction with the usual intent of free deliveries of equipment to the host state.

Ideal conditions for conducting SSR never exist. Therefore, in each situation it is advisable to apply an individual approach. Security and justice bodies are important in each state. In newly emerging democracies, where the rule of law is often weak, there is a sense of a lack of control over security forces activities — and sometimes impunity; initial contacts with SSR providers and equipment suppliers may convince personnel to continue their ways of thinking, questioning reform legitimacy. Improving the operational capacity of security forces without enhancing their management and control may provoke inclinations to an unlawful use of repression and force.

Uneasy political conditions may also arise in multi-ethnic societies when representatives of some ethnic groups in government try to prove which group possess more influence. Therefore, the multi-ethnicity of some states should also be taken into consideration during preparation of SSR strategies, because priority treatment of areas inhabited by particular ethnic groups can cause intra-state divisions and marginalisation of some social groups.

A vital issue is an in-depth understanding of the various laws, institutional, and religious aspects within a host state. For example, most English-speaking countries practice common law, while most Latin and francophone African states practice civil law. This fact causes differences in legal structures and in interactions

⁸ Bleiker Ch, Krupanski M, *The rule of law and security sector reform: conceptualizing a complex relationship*. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Geneva, 2012, p. 38.

between courts, prosecutors and law enforcement authorities. In some countries religious law plays a major role. Their implications should also be taken into consideration while providing support of SSR processes.

Security sector's assessment

Engagement in SSR requires a deep knowledge of the host state's security environment. Those conducting implementation should be aware of opportunities, neutral factors, risks and threats. Knowledge of which groups (political, social, ethnic) are supportive towards SSR initiatives, and which are against, is also crucial. Because developing strategies and programmes of Security Sector Reform influence the local power dynamics, a vital issue is to make an early assessment of what influence the outcomes of SSR will have on the security situation.

A security sector assessment process consists of a series of consultations, information gathering, performing analysis and drawing conclusions. This process is usually started by setting up an assessment team. During the team members' selection process, subject matter expertise from all important fields should be ensured, such as security, defence, justice, finance and management. To prove transparency of conducted activities, it is important to ensure the presence of host state's national representatives in the assessment team. It is also crucial to ensure the presence of staff proficient in local languages, or lacking this possibility, the utilization of interpreters (language assistants).⁹

An assessment should be characterized by a considerable degree of integrity. Even if the reform programmes are sometimes focused only on one element of a security sector, it should be assessed how its reform influences institutions and aspects directly connected, but also those indirectly connected or seemingly not connected. International players leading the SSR should also remember that the situation within any security sector may dynamically change and assessment results may rapidly be outdated.

The next phase in an assessment of a security sector is to define a proper scope of research, which should include strong and weak aspects and priorities for realisation. To reach it, the scope should encompass aims, expectations, time-frames, budget, methodology, opportunities, risks and threats. As a matter of fact, a security sector assessment has two main objectives. First of all, it should allow for an in-depth familiarisation with the current situation, and secondly it should let authorities of the host state know what kind of advantages the reforms will bring to their state. Full support of the host state is the most important critical factor for SSR implementation and success.

Another essential factor for success is employment of an appropriate methodology for the conduct of the assessment. It is advised that both theoretical and empirical methods are applied, quantitative, qualitative, and also triangulation of conclusions received from previous methods. Recommended methodology consists of theoretical research of previous reports and assessments, national documentation, strategies, concepts, plans, law and financial documents.

⁹ Naraghi S, Conaway C.P, *Inclusive security, sustainable peace: a toolkit for advocacy and action*. Security Issues. Washington, 2005, p. 35.

Empirical methods may consist of interviews with a host state's key personnel, field research and observation of community's experiences, feelings and expectations and research of chosen social groups.

Full assessment of a security sector should be preceded by preliminary research. Continuation of the full assessment may take the form of examination of particular subsectors or detailed research of particular problems.

Elaboration of SSR strategy

Correctly led processes in previous SSR phases are prerequisites for the development of an effective SSR strategy. Previous experiences in this field indicate that effective SSR strategies are characterised by a good balance between enhancing a sector's efficiency, including operational capacities of security and defence forces, and enhancing the sector's management and opportunities to exercise democratic control.

It is assumed that a team's developing SSR strategies should take into account four rules¹⁰:

1. Enhancing security and justice systems.
2. Improving the sector's governance and enabling democratic control and respect for human rights and dignity.
3. Ensuring local ownership through host state leadership and possibly broad participation of local community.
4. Ensuring sustainability of efforts among others through training and development of the engaged local community and effective financial management.

The first rule is particularly essential. Enhancement of security for host state's society, especially for the most vulnerable and unprotected social groups — including women and children, should be a priority in each SSR strategy.

A correctly prepared SSR strategy should contain the following elements¹¹:

1. Long-term vision of the strategy: politico-strategic objectives, comprehensive approach, types of security and defence forces, justice services.
2. Detailed objectives: objectives within time perspectives, indicators and methods of their verification.
3. Modalities for inter-institutional coordination: division of tasks and responsibilities among governmental and non-governmental bodies and institutions, internal and external coordination mechanisms.
4. Tasks: use of means, assets and experiences for achieving defined objectives.
5. Information strategy: informing national and international public opinion about the conduct of the SSR.
6. Monitoring and control: means of monitoring progress, feedback coupling, assessments, conclusions and way ahead.

¹⁰ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Handbook on Security Sector Reform..., *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹¹ Wulf H, Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2003, p. 8.

Strengthening national security capacities

This phase is key to effective conduct of an SSR. Among national security sector elements, which may require a considerable strengthening before reform implementation processes are started in respective subsectors, there are legal and political bases, security and budgetary strategies, mechanisms for integrated management and monitoring and control capabilities.¹²

Enhancing national capacity is usually the biggest SSR challenge. It is often defined as the centre of gravity of the whole initiative. Failure in efficient security sector strengthening and switching too hastily to the next phase may cause a breakdown of the whole effort.

Capacity development refers to the totality of security sector effectiveness. Its main reference is in regard to personnel and institutional skills in developing legal regulations and strategies, constructing mechanisms, setting up aims and priorities, obtaining support and their execution. Therefore, it is much more than an ordinary training programme and needs time to be properly implemented.

Enhancing the capacity of a national security sector should not solely concentrate on identifying shortfalls, nor should such shortfalls be downplayed to host state authorities. The host state requires full disclosure; understating issues could become an important factor leading to programme failure. Using periodic deliveries of expensive equipment as an encouragement for host state reform support should also be avoided.

In emerging democracies, international players often meet shortages in key legislation documents, which previously were simply not written, developed or implemented. Among such documentation is the national security strategy. Without having it in place, it is difficult to conduct further consideration regarding an SSR. In such cases, before preparing an SSR strategy, the organisation dealing with the reform process should provide help to the host state to develop a national security strategy.

Reform implementation in respective subsectors

A security sector may be divided into different competence subsectors e.g. democratic oversight, defence, special services, border guard, police, justice and penitentiary systems, private units and security companies.

Due to its level of complexity and the order of magnitude of expenses, SSR implementation, can rarely be led in all mentioned subsectors at the same time. However, a common denominator for these subsectors is documentation of a constitution or type of strategy, so its editing or updating directly influences these subsectors. Moreover, conducting reform in one competence area often necessitates partial engagement in another area. A well-developed SSR strategy should take these facts into account.

If a deeper commitment to widespread SSR engagement in a particular state is invited, applied competences are divided among organisations, third states and other players. However, when various international players become involved

¹² Ball N, Evaluation of the conflict prevention pools. The security sector reform strategy. Evaluation report EV 647. Department for International Development. London, 2004, p. 17.

in the reforms of respective subsectors, activities of this scale and impetus are hard to imagine without having ensured efficient and effective coordination mechanisms. Another essential issue is which of the mentioned subsectors should be treated as reform priorities. Such questions are usually answered by previously conducted analysis, necessary to elaborate strategies and identify discrepancies in each subsector. It is assumed that priority should be given to these subsectors where the identified discrepancies were most significant.

Reforms in respective security subsectors are usually conducted in the following order¹³:

1. Transformation of structures of a given subsector, connected with adjustments of a factual personnel number into a target number.
2. Development and implementation of new rules and programmes of employment, registration and training with the objective of modernisation and personnel reorientation.
3. Transformation support, training and education for personnel of an established or modernised formation.
4. Social transformation and reintegration of previously excluded social groups.

After a precise determination of competences and tasks of a newly established or modernised formation is made, it is necessary to activate appropriate finances to enable the new body's operation. The social dimension of reform requires actions aimed at enhancing society's awareness regarding ongoing changes through the engagement of media and religious organisations, as well as relevant information placed in schools, local offices and governmental institutions.

Monitoring of results and strategy adjustment

Effective implementation of the Security Sector Reform requires the means to monitor achieved results. Each field should be monitored separately; however, an overall supervision of reforms is also required. Strategies should be prepared with a level of flexibility to enable their adjustment to a dynamically changing security environment.

The aim of Security Sector Reform is to enhance national capacity to ensure security and justice, with an assumption of local SSR ownership and ability to provide sustainability of efforts once the reforms are concluded. One of the challenges of monitoring, reviewing and evaluating is to determine if and how performed activities contribute to an accomplishment of the final objective. Progress is usually determined by utilising previously identified SSR strategy indicators predefined in the SSR assessment base values.

Criteria for SSR progress assessment against predefined base values could be the following¹⁴:

1. Objectives accuracy: whether the objectives are still relevant.
2. Effectiveness: whether means and assets brought satisfactory indicators changes.

¹³ Naraghi S, Conaway C.P, Inclusive security, sustainable peace..., *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Handbook on Security Sector Reform..., *op. cit.*, p. 241.

3. Efficiency: whether the invested financial assets bring satisfactory changes to indicators.
4. Impact on reality: is the impact positive or are there any negative aspects.
5. Local ownership: was it achieved or should there be changes to achieve it.
6. Sustainability of efforts: is it achieved, will it be continued after reforms are concluded.

Security Sector Reform plays a fundamental significance in a state's peaceful and balanced economic development, as well as for the betterment of society's existence both in a short and long term perspectives. In the short term perspective, SSR should reduce corruption and contribute to societal trust and credibility building towards security formations and armed forces.¹⁵

In the long term, SSR effects should be considered in four dimensions¹⁶:

1. Political dimension, related to the civilian and democratic control over military and civilian elements.
2. Institutional dimension, related to security subsectors transformations and concrete changes in respective formations.
3. Economic dimension, related to security formations and armed forces financing.
4. Social dimension, referring to local community employment, engagement and interaction with society.

SSR Processes: A Case Study of Egypt

In January 2011 an unprecedented social mobilisation took place in Egypt, known as the "25th January Revolution" or "18 Days Revolution", as after only 18 days, on 11 February 2011, it led to President's Hosni Mubarak's overthrow. The most significant reasons behind the Revolution were Egyptian society's resistance to brutality, lawlessness and corruption within the governmental security structures. Among the core reasons to thoroughly reform the nation's security sector were attempts to bring about changes in the approach of security forces' personnel towards the people, and to remove from power the politicians who gave the authority to mistreat citizens.

After Hosni Mubarak's overthrow, power in Egypt was assumed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) until 30 June 2012, when Egypt's new President, Muhammad Morsi, was sworn in. The SCAF agreed to the conduct of free parliamentary and presidential elections. Resulting from these, Morsi was elected as the first democratic President of Egypt.

On 17 June 2012 the ruling council of SCAF issued an annex to the Constitutional Declaration dated 30 March 2011 limiting the president's authority over armed forces management and shaping national security policy. The SCAF itself assumed direct authority over the armed forces. Soon after, two events took place directly provoking the necessity of changes in the armed forces' management. On 5 August 2012, a group of militants in the Sinai Peninsula, in the vicinity of the Israeli-Egyptian

¹⁵ Naraghi S, Conaway C.P, Inclusive security, sustainable peace..., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

border, attacked an Egyptian border post, killing 16 soldiers. The gunmen then commandeered two armoured personnel carriers and infiltrated across the border into Israel. As a result, President Muhammad Morsi dismissed the SCAF chairman, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who also served as Egypt's Minister of Defence. Senior commanders throughout the armed forces were also dismissed. President Morsi suspended the SCAF amendment to the Constitutional Declaration. He then nominated a new Minister of Defence, the former Chief of Military Intelligence, General Abdel Fattah Al Sisi. Implications of the conflict between the civilian head of state and high ranking officers led to further tensions and attempts for a takeover of power. After one year in power, on 30 June 2013, as a result of social protest and a coup d'état, Muhammad Morsi was removed from the position of president by his own Minister of Defence, Al Sisi. Morsi was accused of promoting an authoritarian style of governance and attempting to implement Islamic Law over secular governance, in particular in the state security sector.

Military authorities of Egypt, being afraid of a potential loss of their importance, treated with reserve all attempts and intent for SSR processes to be conducted in their country. In this strategic context, the military authorities were seeking to avoid means and assets consuming confrontations with neighbouring countries, particularly Israel. They were also not interested in costly international security policy initiatives, being anxious that civilian authorities — after gaining power — would start enhancing their conduct. On the other hand, to sustain the flow of military armament and equipment, they were interested in keeping friendly relations with the United States. In general, Egyptian military authorities were trying to avoid any democratic reforms which, when conducted, could weaken their monopoly in defining the geopolitical strategy of Egypt.¹⁷

The military authorities were in possession of important high-yielding production and trade companies, the budgets of which were only partially subject to independent civilian control. Therefore, there was no doubt that the military authorities were neither interested in introducing democratic standards of defence and security management nor ensuring transparency of expenses. The military authorities also made attempts to gain control over the budgets of other ministries.

The drastic measures taken during the crisis — suppressing democratic movements and demonstrations with the use of deadly force towards unarmed protesters — brought about society's demands for penal action to be conducted against governmental groups and individuals suspected of supporting and engaging in these types of activities.

In such hostile conditions, Egypt's civilian authorities asked the international community to consider assisting them in conducting Security Sector Reform with the aim of attaining democratic standards comparable to upper-tier developed states. Due to cultural and political environments, the first phase of SSR was difficult, even with the unanimous political support of the host government.

An effective SSR process consists of several phases of the sector's transformation or reconstruction, the aim of which is to introduce the rule of law based on democratic governance. Moreover, SSR should enhance the security services'

¹⁷ Brumberg D, Sallam H, The politics of security sector reform in Egypt. Special report 318. United States Institute of Peace. Washington, 2012, p. 3.

capabilities of ensuring support to society under the supervision of civilian institutions. The mode of proceeding during selection and implementation of SSR programmes may span from early post-conflict situations to those in which transition from authoritarian to democratic systems is envisaged. Egypt's case belongs to the latter category where the dynamics of required changes depends on the power-play between civilian and military leaders.

Among the most important SSR priorities in Egypt was the necessity to end armed forces' sponsored political and economic initiatives that were in no way connected to defence — and also enabling all military activities to be controlled by democratically elected civilian institutions. Another priority was to ensure transformation of the national police from a force of political repression into a neutral organization of law and order, performing its activities with respect to human dignity for the benefit of their citizens.

The priorities possessed a common denominator being a general necessity to introduce deep institutional changes. Even after President Hosni Mubarak's overthrow, commencement of the aforementioned reforms turned out to be a challenge. On numerous occasions civilian security forces — together with the military — used deadly force against citizens who demanded the removal of the SCAF Council from power. The authorities' firm resistance against any changes within their security sector made it impossible to start SSR¹⁸.

Egyptian Armed Forces consist of army, air force, navy and air defence with all forces subordinated directly to the Minister of Defence. In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, which remained in force until Hosni Mubarak's overthrow, the President of Egypt possessed the function of the highest superior of the armed forces. According to the Constitution, the Armed Forces should be the property of the state and society while their mission was the state's defence, its territorial integrity and state security from external threats. Until the Revolution of 25th January 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces constituted an important element of political state activities. From the overthrow of the Egyptian Monarchy in 1952, every President of Egypt originated from the officers corps. The Armed Forces engagement in politics was probably most visible in the period 1956–1970, during Gamal Abdel Nasser's presidency, when officers occupied a number of posts not only in the government but also in public sector companies. In 1967, as a result of the Six-Day War with Israel being lost, President Nasser decided on enhanced professionalization of the Armed Forces, reducing his officers' engagement in areas unrelated to the military. Although this trend was continued for some years, it was not entirely eliminated.

In September 1978 Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Agreement, one that led to the signing of a Peace Treaty in 1979. As a result of additional agreements with the United States, the Americans committed themselves to paying both Egypt and Israel aid funds which in case of Egypt amounted to \$2 billion (USD) paid yearly in the period 1979–1997. The United States also decided to provide Egypt with help to modernise their Armed forces. Paradoxically this did not help in separating the Armed Forces from politics.

In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the mission of the Egyptian Armed Forces should be state defence. However, since the implementation of the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

constitution, military commanders have prioritised the economic growth of the country, additional to defence. Egyptian Armed Forces were in possession of an economically vast industrial empire that included construction, transport, tourism, pharmaceuticals and food. Companies were bringing in untaxed incomes, often going to private accounts rather than to the state budget. The Armed Forces were in possession of their own bank accounts while their budget remained independent from the state.¹⁹ Credible data regarding production output of the military economic empire are missing. State sources officially indicate the value of 10 per cent of the Gross National Product GNP, while unofficial sources indicate as much as 40 per cent. Defining the real value is difficult due to the “conspiracy of silence” that rules the country. Local media are banned from broadcasting information regarding military issues.²⁰

In the aftermath of the 25th January Revolution, which led to the overthrow of President Mubarak, the Egyptian military elite felt growing exasperation. It was partly connected to the potential loss of revenue streams from their industry, but most of all from civil society’s demand to punish those who were guilty of bloody suppressions during the demonstrations against the government in 2011. Essentially the Egyptian military establishment had vital interests in avoiding transferring even a small portion of power to democratically elected civilian institutions. At the beginning of 2012, under the SCAF Council’s authority, attempts were made to create a set of rules defining the status of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Named after the author, at that time Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister Ali Mohamed El Selmi, this set of rules was named “El Selmi Document”. The most important parts concerned presidential supervision over national defence and state security, including preparation and realisation of the armed forces budget. However, El Selmi’s document was never accepted for common use.

Because of continued discussion regarding the possible future shape of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and more importantly a way of managing them, a few problem areas were identified as issues that later influenced SSR processes:

1. Acquisition by the President of the function of the highest superior of the armed forces without delegating responsibility and authority to any military elements.
2. Subordination of the armed forces, their activities and budget to civilian parliamentary supervision.
3. Limiting the armed forces mission to tasks of national defence and state security and abstaining from lucrative financial activities.

In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the President of Egypt was not only the highest superior of the armed forces but also supreme commander of police security forces. During Hosni Mubarak’s presidency, the President also chaired the Supreme Council of the Police (SCP), responsible for defining the police mission, tasks, priorities and strategic management of the formation.

The Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 defined the Police as a civilian force responsible for ensuring law, order and public security. The Egyptian National

¹⁹ Harb I, *The Egyptian military in politics: disengagement or accommodation?*, *Middle East Journal*. Washington, 2003, p. 272.

²⁰ Marshall and Stacher, *Egypt’s Generals*. Beirut: Arab Studies Institute, 2012, p. 12.

Security Forces were part of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). In 2010 the MIA employed approximately 1,800,000 personnel, including 900,000 in the police, 500,000 in Central Security Forces (CSF) and 400,000 within State Security Investigations Services (SSIS). During Hosni Mubarak's presidency, the numbers and status of security service personnel grew considerably, mainly because of the fight they led against extremists, but also because of the necessity to possess tools to neutralise growing social unrest and dissatisfaction. In 2011 the MIA evolved into a sophisticated and efficient tool for citizen persecution and repression.²¹

The Egyptian peoples' hostile attitude towards the hated security services led to the 25th January Revolution — being a huge social mobilisation against the authorities. Those who participated in the protests treated it as a tremendous success by managing to force the withdrawal of uniformed services from Egyptian streets — services which were no longer able to prevent President Mubarak's overthrow. The 18 Days Revolution was mainly directed against security services brutality and lawlessness, as well as fighting back for years of citizen humiliation and repression. This deeply embedded hatred did not cease even after the change of ruling powers.

During Hosni Mubarak's presidency, activities of all services subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs were focused on supporting the regime's interests. The State Security Investigations Services (SSIS) were broadly involved in applying repression techniques, monitoring activities of politicians and political parties, and persecuting and arresting of the regime's adversaries. The SSIS possessed a considerable influence in shaping the activities of ministries, state institutions, offices, universities, and manning key positions in the governmental administration.

The Central Security Forces (CSF) were a pseudo-paramilitary police force, assigned to counter terrorism and insurgency, as well as crowd and riot control. Through the use of disproportionate force, they were often deployed to suppress anti-governmental social manifestations. According to Egyptian sources, the Ministry of Internal Affairs often employed criminals for such activities. During the 25th January Revolution, Egyptian security services used criminal gangs in civilian clothes to attack people protesting against President Mubarak's regime. The brutality of security services was not only limited to fighting political opponents. As a regular practice, Egyptian police conducted accidental detentions of ordinary citizens as a preventive measure, and then used against them cruel investigative methods.²²

However, the 18 Days Revolution did not bring the expected democratic changes which would have led to a thorough reform of Egypt's Security Sector. Only some cosmetic changes were made, such as reshuffling some key personnel. The most significant change was the nomination to the position of the Minister of Internal Affairs of a retired police general, Mansour El Essawy, who received two ambitious objectives: 1) MIA reformation, and 2) developing societal trust towards the security services. El Essawy transformed the hated SSIS service into the Homeland Security Service (HSS) among others responsible for ensuring internal security and anti-terrorist activities, with an entire ban on the application of persecution and repression

²¹ El Hennawy N, *The making of a police state: from the battle of Ismailiya to Khaleed Saeed*. Cairo, 2012, p. 2.

²² Amar P, *Why Mubarak is out?* Beirut: Arab Studies Institute, 2011, p. 20.

techniques that were earlier the domain of SSIS. What is more, El Essawy unprecedentedly dismissed 600 high ranking security service officers, 25 of whom were previously accused of murdering protestors.²³

According to the 1971 Constitution, the Egyptian police was established as a civilian force serving the whole of society. However, the lack of transparency in its activities made the police to be seen by Egyptian citizens as a security service with its own rules and rights. Because of a prolonged lack of government initiatives in reforming the police, actions were taken by other institutions and organisations. One of them was the National Initiative for Rebuilding the Police (NIRP) consisting of former policemen and ordinary citizens for whom it was essential to establish a police force acting for the benefit of the society with respect for human dignity. It was assumed that the police would be entirely civilian, based on the rule of law and decentralised powers. It was also planned that police unions would be established with the aim of fighting for policemen's rights and improvement of their service conditions. To prevent persecution and repressive practices, it was planned to create an efficient oversight mechanism for police activities. The NIRP also proposed a set of long-term means aimed at increasing transparency of police actions and — in a broader sense — of the whole Ministry of Internal Affairs. Experts recommended for the minister's position to be held by a person from outside of the security establishment, possibly a politician who would take up activities which would enhance the population's trust in the MIA and its subordinated forces. It was also postulated to dissolve the Central Security Forces, creating in their place anti-terrorist units and incorporating them in the regional police commands. The aim of this idea was to prevent the attacking of potential protesters by centralised police units, and in their place ensure protester security utilising local police forces. Moreover, it was planned to create regulations for rules of engagement and use of force, including deadly force, as a last resort of police response to threats. Another recommendation was to avoid recruiting only law graduates at the Police Academy. This trend had the purpose to limit and finally completely stop partisanship, while admitting students who later became police officers.

In May 2012 the Lower Chamber of Defence and National Security Committee (DNSC) conducted broad discussions over the NIRP proposals. However, it is not clear which of the proposals were to be accepted, and if accepted, whether they would be implemented. SSR possibilities were dependent on future political changes, among them the state's political system, which could evolve one way or another.

In the media Egypt was described as a state being in the course of democratic changes, with the aim of conducting thorough security sector reform. Nevertheless, in the light of the analysis presented it seems obvious that a firm political will to introduce changes is still missing. Based on the theory, conditions and phases for an efficient SSR which include ensuring local ownership and political support of the host state as indispensable conditions for success, in the case of Egypt these were not satisfactory. Ensuring political support is phase one, and without having it properly implemented it is not recommended to move to the next phases.

²³ El Gundy Z, Egypt's Ministry of Interior announces the biggest reshuffle in history. Cairo, 2011, p. 1.

In January 2014, as a result of a referendum conducted, Egypt adopted a new Constitution, based largely on the 1971 version. It foresees coexistence of institutions of the president and parliament. According to the new Constitution's text, the President is appointed by the parliament and, as a compromise, the Minister of Defence is appointed by the Armed Forces. The Constitution also guarantees gender equality and freedom of religion. At the same time the Constitution superseded previously implemented Islamic laws.

In June 2014 presidential elections took place in Egypt, won by Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, former Minister of Defence.

Conclusion

The theoretical aspects of Security Sector Reform presented in the first part of this essay possess a common feature of significant influence on process effectiveness. The model reform process was developed based on "SSR good practices", which is recommended for wide usage.

Security Sector Reform was defined as a transformation of all areas of a security sector in such way that it would ensure effective and efficient sector management and operation in accordance with democratic norms, rules of good governance and respect for human dignity.

Amongst conditions of an effective reform, there is the need for applying a single SSR strategy, maximising benefits of means and assets, ensuring local ownership and sustainability of efforts. Regarding phases, an SSR model process should start with ensuring political support, security sector assessment and then development of the SSR strategy. Then the security sector's capacities should be strengthened in their respective areas of responsibility leading to an execution of the most essential phase — implementation, which if conducted properly, allows for the shift to the last phase of the process — strategy adjustment sustaining the results.

Collective SSR theory, observed in the practical example of Egypt, proves how complex and sophisticated efforts should be performed to effectively reform a security sector. Due to this reason, among others, SSR activities in Egypt this far are less than satisfactory.

Even though the first phase was not fully completed, meaning the political powers were not fully willing to reform their security sector, some organisations tried to exert efforts to carry out reforms, though as it turned out later, unsatisfactorily. In the current political climate, the present conditions are also not favourable. International organisations regularly accuse President Al Sisi and his regime of not respecting basic human rights and human dignity.

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Streszczenie. Reforma sektora bezpieczeństwa SSR (ang. Security Sector Reform) jest zagadnieniem i działalnością przemian systemów obronności, sprawiedliwości i praworządności. Zgodnie z podejściem Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych, SSR jest czynnikiem krytycznym dla konsolidacji pokoju i stabilności, redukcji ubóstwa, promowania praworządności i zapobiegania nawrotom konfliktów. W ostatnich latach, w kontekście demokratycznych transformacji wielu państw, koncepcja ta znacznie zyskała na popularności i zainteresowaniu wiodących międzynarodowych organizacji bezpieczeństwa oraz pojedynczych państw. W przeszłości pełne procesy SSR zostały z powodzeniem przeprowadzone w postkomunistycznych państwach Europy Środkowowschodniej. Obecnie procesy reform trwają w niektórych państwach Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, niektóre spośród nich będąc prawdziwymi wyzwaniami. Procesy związane z reformą sektora bezpieczeństwa cechują się dużym stopniem złożoności.

Miedzy innymi z tego powodu, społeczność międzynarodowa podjęła próby znormalizowania zasad i założeń prowadzenia reform, w celu zapewnienia możliwie najwyższej efektywności wykorzystywanych rzadkich zasobów. Problematyka reformy sektora bezpieczeństwa jest relatywnie nowym obszarem wiedzy, w szczególności z niewielką liczbą publikacji prezentujących teorię w powiązaniu z praktyką. W trakcie prowadzonych badań naukowych przyjęto hipotezę, że pomimo różnorodności przedsięwzięć do zrealizowania w ramach procesów SSR w różnych państwach, łączy je pewien model ogólny, którego zastosowanie zapewniłoby najwyższą efektywność prowadzonych działań. Niniejsze opracowanie ma na celu przedstawienie wybranych aspektów teoretycznych SSR, kluczowych dla zwiększenia efektywności prowadzonych reform wraz z omówieniem tej problematyki na przykładzie problemów SSR w Egipcie.

Резюме. Реформа сектора безопасности (РСБ, англ. Security Sector Reform) является вопросом и деятельностью, связанными с переменами в системах обороны, правосудия и законодательства. Согласно подходу Организации Объединенных наций, РСБ стало критическим фактором при консолидации мира и стабильности, снижении уровня нищеты, укреплении верховенства закона и предотвращении возобновлении конфликтов. В последнее время в контексте демократических перемен, происходящих во многих странах, эта концепция привлекла интерес и приобрела большую популярность как среди ведущих международных организаций по безопасности, так и отдельных стран. В прошлом процессы РСБ были полностью внедрены в пост коммунистических странах Центральной и Восточной Европы. В настоящее время эти процессы проводятся в нескольких странах Африки и Ближнего Востока, и некоторые из них стали настоящим вызовом. Все процессы, связанные с реформой сектора безопасности, отличаются высокой степенью сложности. Поэтому международная общественность предприняла попытки унифицировать правила и задачи проведения реформ, с целью обеспечения максимально возможной эффективности при использовании дефицитных ресурсов. Проблематика реформы сектора безопасности является относительно новой областью знаний, особенно в том, что касается количества публикаций, представляющих теорию в тесной связи с практикой. Во время проведенных научных исследований была принята гипотеза, что, несмотря на разнообразие проектов, которые будут реализованы в рамках процессов РСБ в разных странах, все они объединены некой общей моделью, использование которой обеспечит высочайшую эффективность операций. Целью настоящей работы является представление избранных теоретических аспектов РСБ, которые стали ключевыми для увеличения эффективности проводимых реформ, а также дискуссия над данным вопросом на примере проблем РСБ в Египте.